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I. INTRODUCTION 
This essay critiques the operation of the margin of appreciation (MoA) within the ECHR 
system with respect to religious rights.1 It submits that the sophisticated manner in which the 
ECtHR uses the MoA as an instrument of supervision renders it a defensible conceptual and 
intellectual instrument for international bodies supervising polycentric rights claims, which is 
commonly the case in relation to religious rights. The MoA necessarily has to be complex but 
that does not necessarily render the outcome of its application as uncertain. The identification 
or otherwise of consensus as crucial to the application of the MoA. That being so, it is 
submitted that it is the issue of ‘framing’ the question or issue to which consensus relates,  
that is crucial to the application of the MoA. Indeed, it is commonly determinative thereof. 
Finally, the essay highlights the importance to the application of the MoA of the national 
domestic processes of reasoning, contestation and evaluation.  
Each section considers aspects of the MoA but with specific reference to ECHR 
jurisprudence relating to religious rights. Section 2 examines the place of religious rights in 
the ECHR. Section 3 briefly examines the relationship between religion and human rights. 
Section 4 addresses the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on 
religious rights. Section 5 critiques the role and operation of the MoA in religious cases, 
including the major decisions in which the MoA has been central to the outcome. Section 6 
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1 For more general critiques see D Spielmann, ‘Allowing the Right Margin the European 
Court of Human Rights and the National Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Waiver or 
Subsidiarity of European Review?’ (2011-12) 14 Cambridge YB of European Legal Studies 
381 (updated at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20140113_Heidelberg_ENG.pdf); 
A Legg, The Margin of Appreciation in International Human Rights Law Deference and 
Proportionality (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012); D McGoldrick, ‘A Defence of the 
Margin of Appreciation and An Argument for its Application by the Human Rights 
Committee’ (2016) 65 ICLQ 00 (forthcoming).  
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contains a case study of the Judgment of the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR in Fernandez 
Martinez v Spain in 2014. Section 7 offers some concluding reflections.  
 
 
II. THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
Although it might appear an obvious point, it should be clearly stated that, on any historical 
or textual basis, religious rights should bear significant weight in the ECHR system. The 
protection of religious rights and religious identities has a strong historical pedigree.2 The 
inclusion of Article 9 ECHR on ‘Freedom of thought, conscience and religion’ and of 
‘religion’ as a prohibited ground of discrimination in Article 14 were relatively 
uncontroversial.3 The right to education in Article 1 of Protocol 2 was qualified by the 
obligation on states to ‘respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in 
conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions.’ Freedom of religion is 
reflected in all of the major international and regional human rights treaties. It is a classic 
civil right and is, in that sense, special or exceptional.4 The MoA can be viewed as a device to 
accommodate differing views on the exceptionalism of religion and the consequences thereof. 
 
II. RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
Whatever the place of religion in the ECHR, religions and human rights can be nonetheless 
be understood as constituting different and competing normative orders. Thus the relationship 
between religion and human rights law is thus inherently unstable and ambivalent.5 Religion 
professes faith in a God’s (or some other higher being’s) prescriptions rather than human 
                                                          
2 See M Evans ‘An Historical Introduction to the Freedom of Religion and Belief’ in C 
Durham et al (eds) Facilitating Freedom of Religion and Belief: The Oslo Coalition 
Deskbook (The Hague, Kluwer, 2004), 1. 
3 See C Evans, Freedom of Religion Under The European Convention on Human Rights 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001) 38-50. Protection against discrimination based on 
religion is also reflected in Article 1 of Protocol 12 (2000) (general right to equality) (18 
ratifications as of 9 November 2015). 
4 See A. Shachar, ‘Demystifying Culture’ (2012) 10(2) I-CON International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 429; D McPherson, ‘The Claims of Religious Identities in Secular 
Societies’ 17 (2016) Journal of Religion & Society (forthcoming). 
5 See R Sandberg, Law and Religion (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011); K. 
Woods, Human Rights (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2014) 84-103. 
3 
 
laws on the rights of men or women. Religions want the protection of the human rights law 
for their social and institutional existence and for their beliefs and manifestations thereof. 
However, they are instinctively prone to resist any incursion by the laws into areas where 
their beliefs and decisions are assessed for compatibility with national or international secular 
norms, including human rights norms.6 Particular difficulties are created if courts try to assess 
religious doctrines and beliefs or subject them to secular standards of rationality, 
proportionality and non-discrimination.7 From a human rights perspective religious claims for 
autonomy are often perceived as seeking privilege and exceptionalism.8  
Thus, religions are always in a troublesome dialectical relationship with the human 
rights law.9 Major judicial decisions by the European Court of Human Rights can signal the 
ways in which that relationship is evolving within the more than 820 million persons who 
live in the communities of the 47 member states of the Council of Europe. Since the entry 
into force of the ECHR most states have become home to a greater multiplicity of religions 
with their own history and traditions. The Eastward expansion of ECHR membership after 
1989 has further multiplied this effect.10 Both across and within the now 47 member states 
                                                          
6 See generally I Leigh and R Adhar, Religious Freedom in the Liberal State, 2nd edn, 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013). A contemporary example relates the compatibility 
of male circumcision with human rights standards, see M Germann and C Wackernagel, ‘The 
Circumcision Debate from a German Constitutional Perspective’ (2015) 4 Oxford Journal of 
Law and Religion 442; Freedom of Religion and Living Together in a Democratic Society, 
Report and Resolution of Committee on Culture, Science, Education and Media of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Doc 13851 (6 July 2015).  
7 See P Edge, ‘Determining Religion in English Courts’ (2012) 1 Oxford Journal of Law and 
Religion 402; R Sandberg, ‘The Right to Discriminate’ (2011) 13 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 
157; AS Hofri-Winogradow. ‘A Plurality of Discontent: Legal Pluralism, Religious 
Adjudication and the State’ (2010/11) 26 Journal of Law and Religion 57; R. (on the 
application of Williamson) v Secretary of State for Education and Employment [2005] UKHL 
15, [2005] 2 A.C. 246 (concerning biblical beliefs in administering corporal punishment to 
discipline children). 
8 See MD Evans et al (eds) The Changing Nature of Religious Rights Under International 
Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015) (particularly the essays by Glendon, Bielefeldt 
and Petkoff); D. McGoldrick ‘Religion and Legal Spaces – In Gods we Trust; in the Church, 
We Trust, but need to Verify’ (2012) 12 HRLR 759. 
9 See M Hunter-Henin (ed), Law, Religious Freedoms and Education in Europe (Farnham, 
Ashgate, 2011). 
10 See T Loenen and JE Goldschmidt (eds), Religious Pluralism and Human Rights in 
Europe:Where to Draw the Line? (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2007); L. Zucca, A Secular Europe: 
Law and Religion in the European Constitutional Landscape (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2012). 
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there is a wide variety of Church-state relations.11 At the foundation of the ECtHR’s approach 
to religious rights within the CoE communities, and its development of the concept of the 
MoA to frame its human rights assessment of the consequences of those relationships, has 
been its repeated acceptance that it is ‘not possible to discern throughout Europe a uniform 
conception of the significance of religion in society; even within a single country such 
conceptions may vary.’12 Thus the application of the MoA means that some restrictions on 
rights may vary from one State to another or even from one region to another within the same 
State, especially a State that has opted for a federal type of political organisation.13 In 
observing that, in such cases, only serious reasons could lead the ECtHR to substitute its own 
assessment for that of the national and local authorities, which are closer to the realities of 
their country, the ECtHR stressed the subsidiary nature of the ECHR system.14 On the 
foundation of variety of Church-state relations the ECtHR commonly overlays findings that 
in the particular issue of religious rights under dispute, as framed by the ECtHR, – be it 
religious dress,15 the financing and taxation of churches16 or the protection of the ‘rights of 
others’ in relation to forms of expression that constitute attacks on their religious 
                                                          
11 See N Doe, Law and Religion in Europe - A Comparative Introduction (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2011); R Adhar and I Leigh, ‘Is Establishment Consistent With Religious 
Freedom’ (2004) 49 McGill LJ 635; F Tulkens, ‘The ECHR and Church-State Relations: 
Pluralism Versus Pluralism’ (2008-09) 30 Cardozo Law Review 2575; and C Evans and CA 
Thomas, ‘Church-State Relations in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2006) 3 Brigham 
Young University Law Review 699; J Temperman, ‘Are State Churches Contrary to 
International Law?’ (2013) 2 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 119.  
12 Müller and Others v Switzerland, A. 10737/84, paras 30, 35; Otto-Preminger Institut v 
Austria, A. 13470/87, para 50.  
13 See Murphy v Ireland, A. 44179/98 (10 July 2003) (upholding the ban of religious 
advertising in Northern Ireland); Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v Switzerland [GC], A. 
16354/06, paras 64-5. 
14 Murphy, ibid; A Mowbray, ‘Subsidiarity and the European Convention on 
Human Rights’ (2015) 15 HRLR 313. 
15 See M Ssenyonjo, ‘The Islamic Veil and Freedom of Religion, the Rights to Education and 
Work’ (2007) 6 Chinese Journal of International Law 653; R McRea, ‘The Ban on the Veil 
and European Law’ (2013) 13(1) HRLR 50; D McGoldrick, ‘Extreme Religious Dress: 
Perspectives on Veiling Controversies’ in I Hare and J Weinstein (eds) Extreme Speech and 
Democracy (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009) 400-29; E Howard, Law and the 
Wearing of Religious Symbols: European bans on the Wearing of Religious Symbols in 
Education (Oxford, Routledge, 2012); M Hunter-Henin, Why the French Don’t Like the 
Burqa: Laïcité, National Identity and Religious Freedom’ (2012) 61 ICLQ 1. 
16 See Spampinato v Italy, A. 23123/04 (29 April 2010: inadmissible). 
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convictions17 - there is similarly no common European standard or rule. Such a finding is 
usually a precursor to the ECtHR holding that the state will have acted within its MoA. The 
unstated finding is that the ECtHR has considered that it is not for it to establish such a 
common European standard. The consequence in human rights terms is that there is a kind of 
renvoi of the issue back to national political and legal systems. Good examples are Lautsi v 
Italy18 the consequence of which was to return the issue to the Italian courts to await future 
judgments on the application of the principle of secularism under the Italian Constitution, and 
Şahin v Turkey,19 the consequence of which was to return the issue to the Turkish jurisdiction 
to await political and legal developments. Subsequent to the ECtHR’s findings of no violation 
of Article 9, constitutional and administrative provisions were effectively re-interpreted by 
the executive and the Parliament to allow the wearing of religious clothing at Universities and 
by civil servants and Members of Parliament.20 Absent such developments at the national 
level, the issue will stay within the MoA, a sufficient consensus or international trend will 
evolve such that the ECtHR considers it appropriate to deduce the existence of a common 
European standard, or exceptionally, the ECtHR will consider that societal developments and 
understandings or international trends have evolved to the point that it is necessary and 
appropriate to establish a common European standard notwithstanding the absence of any 
greater consensus.21 However, it must be acknowledged that a finding of no violation based 
on the MoA may lead to a levelling down of national protections.22 
 
                                                          
17 Wingrove v UK, A. 17419/90, para 58; I.A. v Turkey, A. 42571/98, para 25; I Leigh, 
‘Damned if they do, Damned if they don’t: the European Court of Human Rights and the 
Protection of Religion from Attack’ (2011) 17 Res Publica 55. 
18 [GC], A. 30814/06 (18 March 2011).  
19 A. 44774/98 (10 November 2005). For criticisms see C Evans, ‘The “Islamic Headscarf “ 
in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2006) 7 Melbourne Law Journal 52; T Lewis, 
‘What not to wear: religious rights, the European Court, and the margin of appreciation’ 
(2007) 56 ICLQ 395; A Vukulenko, ‘“Islamic Headscarves” and the European Convention on 
Human Rights: An Intersectional Perspective’ (2007) 16 Social and Legal Studies 183; P 
Bosset, ‘Mainstreaming Religious Diversity in a Secular and Egalitarian State: the Road(s) 
Not Taken in Leyla Şahin v Turkey’ in E Brems (ed), Diversity and European Human Rights 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013) 192-217. 
20 R Smith, ‘Why Turkey Lifted Its Ban on the Islamic Headscarf’ National Geographic, (12 
October 2013), available at http://news.nationalgeographic.com.  
21 The classic example of the latter exceptional situation is Christine Goodwin v UK, A. 
28957/95. See also K Henrard, ‘How the European Court of Human Rights’ Concern 
Regarding European Consensus Tempers the Effective Protection of Freedom of Religion’ 
(2015) 4 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 398. 
22 See E Brems, ‘Human Rights: Minimum and Maximum Perspectives’ (2009) 9 HRLR 349.  
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III. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS ON 
RELIGIOUS RIGHTS 
 
Commentators have commonly submitted that the ECtHR does not have a very strong record 
in protecting religious rights and point to the MoA as allowing states to reduce the historical 
protection afforded to those rights as times evolve and new human rights claims are made.23 
However, in the interest of a balanced perspective, it is important to acknowledge that the 
ECtHR’s religion-related jurisprudence has been very strong in a four critical respects. First, 
it has considered that the values in Article 9 are at the foundations of a democratic society, 
that maintaining true religious pluralism is inherent in the concept of a democratic society,24 
and that the ‘autonomous existence of religious communities is indispensable for pluralism in 
a democratic society and is at the heart of the protection’ afforded by Article 9.25 Respect for 
the autonomy of religious communities recognised by the State implies that the State should 
accept the right of such communities to govern themselves in accordance with their own rules 
and interests.26 States have a duty of denominational neutrality and impartiality vis-à-vis 
religious communities.27 The State’s role is as the neutral and impartial organiser of the 
practice of religions, faiths and beliefs.28 The State’s duty of neutrality and impartiality 
towards religious communities and beliefs precludes it from assessing the legitimacy validity 
of religious beliefs as long as they attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and 
importance,29 or the ways in which those beliefs are expressed.30 However, what the ECtHR 
accepts as ‘neutrality’ is complex and can cover a variety of different approaches to Church-
                                                          
23 See J Martínez-Torrón, ‘The (Un) Protection of Individual Religious Identity in the 
Strasbourg Case Law, (2012) 1 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 363.  
24 Kokkinakis v Greece, A. 14307/88 (25 May 1993), para 31.  
25 Hasan and Chausch v Bulgaria, A. 30985/96, (26 Oct 2000), para 62. 
26 See Fernandez Martinez v Spain, considered in Part VI below. 
27 See Sindicatul ‘Pastorul cel Bun’ v Romania, [GC] A. 2330/09 (9 July 2013), (in refusing 
to register the applicant union, the State had simply declined to become involved in the 
organisation and operation of the Romanian Orthodox Church, thereby observing its duty of 
denominational neutrality under Article 14 ECHR).  
28 Refah Partisi and Others v Turkey, [GC] A. 41340/98 (13 Feb 2003), para 91. See 
generally R Sandberg (ed), Religion and Legal Pluralism (Ashgate, Farnham, 2015).  
29 See Cumhuriyetçi Eğitim Ve Kültür Merkezi Vakfı v Turkey, A. 32093/10 (2 Dec 2014) 
(system for granting exemptions from payment of electricity bills for places of worship under 
Turkish law - based on an assessment by the Turkish courts on the basis of an opinion issued 
by the authority for religious affairs to the effect that Alevism was not a religion - thus 
entailed discrimination on the ground of religion: violation of Article 14 taken together with 
Article 9). 
30 See Hasan and Chaush v Bulgaria, A. 30985/96) (26 Oct 2000), para 78.  
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State relations.31 Many of those approaches could reasonably be described as endorsement or 
preference for religion but, short of being coercive, they can survive a Convention 
challenge.32 The ECtHR sees this neutral role as conducive to public order, religious harmony 
and tolerance in a democratic society, particularly between opposing groups.  
Secondly, although it has refused to define ‘religion’33 and ‘belief’, the ECtHR has 
interpreted them very widely indeed, 34 arguably too widely.35 Thirdly, it has afforded States 
little by way of MoA to impose registration, re-registration or institutional requirements on 
religious organisations. In Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v Moldova36 the 
ECtHR rejected justifications based on upholding national law and constitutional principles, 
threat to territorial integrity, protecting social peace and understanding among believers and 
proportionality. Tolerance was not a substitute for recognition.37 In Jehovah’s Witnesses of 
                                                          
31 See MD Evans and P Petkoff, ‘A Separation of Convenience? The Concept of Neutrality in 
the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2008) 36 Religion, State and 
Society 205; K Koukouzelis, ‘Neutrality, Religious Symbols and the Question of a 
European Public Space’ (2008) 4 Politics in Central Europe 41.  
32 In Lautsi v Italy, n 18 above, the GC re-affirmed that Article 2 of P1 was principally a 
protection against ‘indoctrination’ by the state and teachers. See though Folgero v Norway, 
[GC] A. 15472/02 (29 June 2007) and Hasan and Eylem Zengin v Turkey (9 October 
2007) in which the ECtHR conducted a very detailed evaluation of the educational course 
concerned, thereby effectively narrowing the MoA. See S Langlaude, ‘Indoctrination, 
Secularism, Religious Liberty and the ECHR’ (2006) 55 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 919; V Ibarra, ‘Why Appearances Matter: State Endorsement of Religious 
Symbols in State Schools in Europe After Lautsi’ (2014) UCL Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence 262; A Mawhinney, ‘Crucifixes, Classrooms and Children: a Semiotic 
Cocktail’, in J Temperman (ed), The Lautsi Papers: Multidisciplinary Reflections on 
Religious Symbols in the Public School Classroom (Leiden, Brill, 2012) 93. 
33 Cf the description of religion adopted by the UK Supreme Court in R (Hodkin and another) 
v Registrar-General of Births, Deaths and Marriages [2013] UKSC 77, para 57 (Lord 
Toulson). See also R. Dworkin, Religion Without God (Cambridge Mass, Harvard University 
Press, 2013). 
34 See D Harris et al, Law of the ECHR, 3rd edn, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014) 
592-4.  
35 The argument is that an over-broad scope effectively trivialises religion by treating 
arguably lesser beliefs, such as vegetarianism or veganism, as on a par with it. On positive 
obligations relating to a Buddist’s vegetarian beliefs while in prison see Vartic v Romania, A. 
14150/08 (17 Dec 2013). 
36 A. 45701/99) (13 Dec 2001) 
37 See also Doğan and Others v Turkey, A. 62649/10 (concerning the rejection of the request 
made by a number of Turkish nationals belonging to the Alevi faith for provision of a 
religious public service which, they maintain, has been granted to date exclusively to the 
majority of citizens, who subscribe to the Sunni understanding of Islam). Oral hearing held 
by GC in June 2015. 
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Moscow v Russia38 the ECtHR the ECtHR found that there had been an unjustified 
dissolution and refusal to re-register the Jehovah’s Witnesses’s religious community in 
Moscow. In doing so it rejected six proffered justifications. In Magyar Keresztény Mennonita 
Egyház and Others v Hungary39 the ECtHR held that the mere absence of apparent consensus 
on the ‘framework of organizational re cognition of otherwise accepted religions’40 could not 
give rise to the same degree of deference to the national authorities’ assessment, especially 
when the matter concerned the framework of organisational recognition of otherwise 
accepted religions (formerly fully-fledged churches) rather than the very acceptance of a 
certain set of controversial teachings as a religion. Otherwise non-traditional religions could 
lose the ECHR’s protection in one country essentially due to the fact that they were not 
legally recognised as churches in others. Although the ECtHR acknowledged the importance 
of ‘historical-constitutional traditions’ when judging a particular system of religion-state 
relations,41 on the facts it did not accept that the scheme reflected Hungarian historical 
tradition fully and disregarded more recent historical developments.42 The problematic 
differential treatment was not in line with state duties of neutrality and impartiality under 
Article 9.43 In Kimlya and Others v. Russia44 a requirement that a religious organization have 
be in existence in the region for at least fifteen years violated Article 9, interpreted in the light 
of Article 11. The ECtHR referred to a Report which noted that ‘there were no other OSCE 
participating States that required the lengthy existence of a religious organisation before 
registration was permitted’.45 There is similarly little by way of MoA to impose requirements 
on individuals to publicise or declare their religious beliefs or the absence thereof.46 Limited 
elements of disclosure may be acceptable for taxation purposes.47 Fourthly, although states 
are accorded a broad MoA regarding state-church religious issues, in terms of Article 14 
ECHR differential treatment based on religion is treated as a ‘suspect’ ground of 
discrimination. Thus stronger reasons will be required in justification for distinctions based 
                                                          
38 A. 302/02 (10 June 2010). 
39 A. 70945/11 and Others (8 April 2014), para 88. 
40 Ibid, para 68. 
41 Ibid, para 100. 
42 Ibid, para 101. 
43 Ibid, para 111. 
44 A. 76836/01 and 32782/03 (1 October 2009), paras 100-102.  
45 Ibid, para 100. 
46 Buscarini and Others v San Marino, [GC] A. 24645/94 (18 Feb 1999); Sinan Isik v Turkey, 
A. 21924/05 (2 Feb 2010); Grzelak v Poland, A. 7710/02 7710/02 (15 June 2010); Dimitras 
and Others v Greece, A. 42837/06 and others, (3 June 2010).  
47 See Wasmuth v Germany, A. 12884/03 (17 Feb 2011). 
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on a difference on religion alone and the state’s MoA will be narrower even in sensitive 
issues such as parental rights,48 or areas where otherwise there would be a wider MoA, such 
as taxation or the provision of public services.49 Preferential treatment of one religion in such 
contexts will commonly found a violation of Article 14.50 The wide MoA under Article 9 and 
the suspect approach under Article 14 are not logically inconsistent.51 The latter simply 
reflects the strength of the contemporary prohibition against discrimination. 
 
IV. THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION IN RELIGIOUS CASES 
 
A. The Role of Consensus in Determining the Margin of Appreciation 
 
In determining the MoA in relation to religious rights the ECtHR may, if appropriate, have 
regard to any consensus and common values emerging from the state practices of the parties 
to the ECHR.52 It makes increasing use of the comparative method to indicate the degree of 
any European consensus on a particular issue. Consensus is significant in terms of weighting 
but it is not necessarily decisive or determinative. If an emerging consensus is not based on 
settled and long-standing principles established in the law of the member States but rather 
reflects a stage of development within a particularly dynamic field of law, this will not 
decisively narrow the MoA.53 An important aspect of looking for the consensus is that the 
                                                          
48 See Hoffman v Austria, A. 12875/87 (23 June 1993); Palau-Martinez v France, A. 
64927/01 (16 December 2003); Vojnity v Hungary, A. 29617/07) (12 Feb 2013) (concerning 
the total removal of a father’s access rights on the grounds that his religious convictions had 
been detrimental to his son’s upbringing).  
49 See Doğan and Others, n 50 above.  
50 Within Article 14 the issue will turn on whether the ECtHR considers the differences in the 
treatment of different religions as having a reasonable and objective justification. See 
Manzanas Martin v Spain, A. 17966/10 (3 April 2012) (difference in treatment between 
priests of the Catholic Church and Evangelical ministers regarding the calculation of their 
pension rights); O’Donoghue v UK, A. 34848/07 (14 Dec 2010) (differential regime that 
those wishing to marry in the Church of England); O Mjöll Arnardóttir, ‘The Differences that 
Make a Difference: Recent Developments on the Discrimination Grounds and the Margin of 
Appreciation under Article 14 of the ECHR’ (2014) 14 HRLR 647.. 
51 Cf. Henrard, n 22 above. 
52 Bayatyan v Armenia [GC], A. 23459/03, para 122, ECHR 2011 (conscientious objection to 
military service); K Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus and the Legitimacy of the European 
Court of Human Rights (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015); Legg, n 1 above, 
103-44; P Paczolay, ‘Consensus and Discretion: Evolution or Erosion of Human Rights 
Protection?’ in Dialogue Between Judges (Strasbourg, ECtHR, 2008) available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Dialogue_2008_ENG.pdf,.  
53 SH v Austria, [GC], A. 57813/00 (3 November 2011), para 96.  
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jurisprudence on particular controversial issues may take significant periods of time to be 
established. That gives states time to reflect on comparative social, economic and scientific 
developments both within and across states. For example, ECHR jurisprudence on 
conscientious objection to military service – which is usually based on religious or equivalent 
beliefs - changed significantly over a 37 year period from the European Commission’s 
decision in Grandrath v Germany54 to the Grand Chamber's judgment in Bayatyan v 
Armenia,55 the facts of which dated back to 2003. In Bayatyan the ECtHR considered that at 
the time of B’s case, the overwhelming majority of Council of Europe member States had 
already recognised in law and practice the right to conscientious objection. Subsequently, 
Armenia also recognised that right. The laws of the Member States - along with the relevant 
international agreements - had therefore evolved so that, at the relevant time, there was 
already a virtual consensus on the question in Europe and beyond. In other cases the ECtHR 
has been satisfied with ‘clear and uncontested evidence’ of a ‘continuing international 
trend’56 or continuing international movement towards legal recognition’.57   
Generally the working assumption of the ECtHR has been that human rights standards 
incrementally and progressively increase,58 and so the MoA only tends to narrow over time. 
Thus consensus is normally relied upon to expand the scope of rights and restrict the scope of 
limitations. However, legal and social experimentation is possible within limits. It is clear 
that it is open to states to impose new restrictions on rights and these may fall within the 
MoA even if other states have not imposed them.59 A striking illustration is the ban on the 
wearing in public places of clothing that is designed to conceal the face (the so-called Burqa-
ban).60 Of the 47 member states of the Council of Europe, only France and Belgium had 
                                                          
54 A. 9532/81 (1986). 
55 [GC] A. 23459/03 (7 July 2011). 
56 See R Sandland, ‘Crossing and Not Crossing: Gender, Sexuality and Melancholy in the 
European Court of Human Rights’ (2003) 11 Feminist LS 191.  
57 Oliari and Others v Italy, A. 18766/11 and 36030/11 (21 July 2015). The three concurring 
judges found a violation on the basis of different, narrower reasoning that was not related to 
consensus or international trends. 
58 See Demir and Baykara v Turkey, A. 34503/97, para 146.  
59 See P Mahoney, ‘Marvellous Richness of Diversity or Invidious Cultural Relativism?’ 
(1998) 19 HRLJ 4 (on social experimentation). 
60 See A Ferrari and S Pastorellivi (eds), The Burqa Affair Across Europe (Farnham, Ashgate 
2013); E Brems (ed), The Experiences of Face Veil Wearers in European and the Law 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014).  
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actually imposed such bans. Nonetheless, in S.A.S. v France61 in 2014 the ECtHR considered 
that there was no European consensus as to whether or not there should be a blanket ban on 
the wearing of the full-face veil in public places.62 The ECtHR held that having regard in 
particular to the breadth of the MoA accorded to France, the ban could can be regarded as 
proportionate to the aim pursued, namely the preservation of the conditions of ‘living 
together’ as an element of the ‘protection of the rights and freedoms of others’.63 A detailed 
analysis of the ECtHR’s practice with respect to consensus published in 2013 concluded that, 
‘consensus analysis is a sound and constructive idea’.64 However, even when judges accept 
the concept of looking for consensus in determining the MoA, there have been cases where 
have been significant and often very critical dissents on how it should be assessed.65  
 
B. Critiques of the Application of the Margin of Appreciation in Religious Rights Cases 
 
A particular criticism relates to the framing or formulation of the issue or question relating to 
religious rights to which consensus does or does not attach. The answer can vary depending 
on the formulation. In Şahin v Turkey66 the narrow factual issue was the regulation of 
religious clothing in a university. There was no uniform European conception of the 
significance of religion in society or the wearing of religious symbols in educational 
institutions but there was a virtual consensus on whether adult women in universities could 
wear religious clothing. Alongside Turkey only two other European states prohibited the 
wearing of religious clothing in Universities. The ECtHR chose the first formulation of the 
consensus issue. The different outcomes of the Chamber and the Grand Chamber in Lautsi v 
Italy, concerning the display of crucifixes in classrooms, can also be explained by how the 
                                                          
61 [GC], A.43835/11, paras 106-59 (1 July 2014). Cf the approach Ahmet Arslan v Turkey, A. 
41135/98 in which the prohibition of a peaceful religious event in the streets was held to 
amount to a disproportionate interference with religious freedoms.  
62 ibid, para 156. 
63 ibid, para 157. Importantly though the ECtHR rejected a number of other justifications 
offered by France related gender equality, human dignity, ibid, paras 118-120. See Marshall, 
n 102 below; Freedom of Religion and Living Together, n 6 above.  
64 See L Wildhaber et al, ‘No Consensus on Consensus? The Practice of the European Court 
of Human Rights’ 33 (2013) HRLJ 248 at 262. Similarly, Kratochvíl, n 87 below, 357. For 
the argument that consensus fails to provide epistemic justification for the belief that human 
rights are universal see E-J K Kim, ‘Justifying Human Rights: Does Consensus Matter? 
(2012) 13 Human Rights Rev 261. 
65 See Folgero v Norway, [GC] A. 15472/02. 
66 [GC], A. 30943/96. 
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issue was framed.67 In Murphy v Ireland68 the ECtHR unanimously held that there was no 
clear consensus between the Contracting States as to the manner in which to legislate for the 
broadcasting of religious advertisements and no ‘uniform conception of the requirements of 
the protection of the rights of others’ in the context of the legislative regulation of the 
broadcasting of religious advertising.69 
C. The Wide Margin of Appreciation and the ‘Fair Balance’ in Religion Cases 
It is notable that the MoA has been invoked in many of the leading and most controversial 
cases concerning concerned religious rights either in terms of their direct limitation, as in 
Şahin v Turkey70 or because of their putative effect in limiting or being limited by other 
rights, as in Otto-Preminger v Austria,71 Wingrove v UK,72 Murphy v Ireland,73 Lautsi v 
Italy;74 Eweida v UK,75 and S.A.S. v France.76 The latter is the context in which the MoA is 
                                                          
67 A. 30814/06 (18 March 2011). See McGoldrick, n 84 below; G. Itzcovich, ‘One, None and 
One Hundred Thousand Margins of Appreciations: The Lautsi Case’ (2013) 13 HRLR 287; M 
Lugato, ‘The “Margin of Appreciation” and Freedom of Religion: Between Treaty 
Interpretation and Subsidiarity’ (2013) 52 Catholic Legal Studies 49.  
68 A. 44179/98 (10 July 2003). 
69 Murphy v Ireland, A. 44179/98 (10 July 2003), paras 67, 81. The prohibition related only 
to advertising in the audio-visual media. 
70 [GC] A. 44774/98 (10 November 2005). For criticisms see C Evans, ‘The “Islamic 
Headscarf “ in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2006) 7 Melbourne Law Journal 52; T 
Lewis, ‘What not to wear: religious rights, the European Court, and the margin of 
appreciation’ (2007) 56 ICLQ 395; A Vukulenko, ‘‘“Islamic Headscarves” and the European 
Convention on Human Rights: An Intersectional Perspective’ (2007) 16 Social and Legal 
Studies 183; P Bosset, above n 20. 
71 A. 13470/87 (20 Sept 1994), paras 46- 50. In Giniewski v France A. 64016/00, para 52 (3 
January 2006) and Aydin Tatlav v Turkey, A. 50692/99 (2 May 2006), paras 27-28 
distinguished between publications which were gratuitiously offensive, as in Otto-Preminger 
and those which were not inherently offensive. 
72 A. 17419/90 (25 November 1996). See the debate between P Mahoney, ‘Universality 
Versus Subsidiarity in the Strasbourg Case Law on Free Speech’ (1997) EHRLR 364 and A 
Lester, ‘Universality Versus Subsidiarity: a Reply’ (1998) EHRLR 73. 
73 A. 44179/98 (10 July 2003). See A Geddis, ‘You can't say 'God' on the radio: Freedom of 
expression, religious advertising and the broadcast media after Murphy v Ireland’ (2004) 9 
EHRLR 181. 
74 A. 30814/06 (18 March 2011). See P Ronchi, ‘Crucifixes, Margin of Appreciation and 
Consensus’ (2011) 13 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 287; Special Issue of (2011) 6 Religion and 
Human Rights 203 ff; Temperman, n 33 above; D McGoldrick, ‘Religion in the European 
Public Square and in European Public Life – Crucifixes in the Classroom’, 11(3) HRLR 
(2011): 451; L Zucca, ‘Lautsi: A Commentary’ (2013) 11 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 218.  
75 See I Leigh and A Hambler, ‘Religious Symbols, Conscience, and the Rights of Others’ 
(2014) 3 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 2.  
13 
 
most commonly and visibly applied.77 It has assumed even more significance as the ECtHR, 
through its case law, has expanded the scope of ECHR rights through its interpretation of the 
ECHR as a ‘living instrument’ and thereby developed the scope of procedural and positive 
obligations.78 Thus in Karaahmed v Bulgaria79 there was a failure to take adequate steps to 
prevent or investigate the disruption of Muslim prayers by offensive and violent 
demonstrators. 
What is notable is that in many cases concerning religious rights, the ECtHR not only 
affords states a MoA, but a ‘wide’ one at that. The scope of the MoA afforded directly relates 
to the strictness of review. Broadly speaking, the wider the margin, the less strict the 
scrutiny80 and vice versa.81 As noted, the basis for affording a wide margin of appreciation is 
the wide variety of constitutional models governing relations between States and religious 
denominations in Europe.82 Thus in Sindicatul ‘Pastorul cel Bun’ v Romania83 the ECtHR, 
after referring to the lack of a European consensus on such relations,84 considered that the 
State enjoyed a wider MoA in this sphere. This encompassed the right to decide whether or 
not to recognise trade unions that operated within religious communities and pursued aims 
that might hinder the exercise of such communities’ autonomy.85 However, six judges 
dissented, partly on the basis that, although constitutional models governing relations 
between the different European States and religious denominations varied greatly, none of 
them excluded members of the clergy from the right to form trade unions.86 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
76 See M Hunter-Henin, ‘Living Together in an Age of Religious Diversity’ (2015) 4 Oxford 
Journal of Law and Religion 1. 
77 See J Kratochvíl ‘The Inflation of the Margin of Appreciation by the European Court of 
Human Rights’ (2011) NQHR 324; O Bakircioglue, ‘The Application of the Margin of 
Appreciation Doctrine in Freedom of Expression and Public Morality Cases’ (2007) 8 
German LJ 711.  
78 See E Brems and J Gerards (eds), Shaping Rights in the ECHR: The Role of the ECtHR in 
Determining the Scope of Human Rights (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
79 A. 30587/13, (24 February 2015). 
80 See Obukhova v Russia, A. 34737/03 (8 January 2009). 
81 However, this is only a generalisation or starting point, see Alajos Kiss v Hungary, A. 
38832/06, (20 May 2010). 
82 See I Leigh and R Adhar, ‘Post-Secularism and the European Court of Human Rights: Or 
How God Never Really Went Away’ (2012) 75 Modern Law Review 1064. 
83 [GC] A. 2330/09 (9 July 2013). 
84 Ibid, para 61. 
85 Ibid, paras 168-171.  
86 Joint Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judges Spielmann, Villiger, López Guerra, Bianku, 
Møse And Jäderblom, para 10. 
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 In assessing whether there exists a pressing social need for the measure in question 
and, in particular, whether the interference was proportionate87 to the legitimate aim pursued, 
regard has to be had to the ‘fair balance’ which has to be struck between the relevant 
competing interests and in respect of which the state enjoys a MoA.88 The breadth of the 
MoA to be accorded to the state can be crucial to the ECtHR’s conclusion as to whether the 
challenged provision struck a fair balance.89 In delimiting the extent of the MoA the ECtHR 
has regard to what is at stake therein.90 Where a particularly important facet of an individual’s 
existence or identity is at stake, the MoA allowed to the State will normally be restricted.91 It 
might be thought that the external manifestation of one’s religious beliefs were such an 
important facet but the ECtHR has not given such a manifestation the additional weight it 
might bear if considered as an aspect of identity within Article 8.92 If the process was 
seriously deficient in some respect, the conclusions of the domestic authorities are more open 
to criticism.93 Significance is also attached to whether the measure deprived the alleged 
victim of the core contents of a Convention right. Thus in Sindicatul ‘Pastorul cel Bun’ v 
Romania 94 applicant union’s members could form a trade union that pursued aims 
compatible with the Church’s Statute and did not call into question the Church’s traditional 
hierarchical structure and decision-making procedures. The applicant union’s members were 
are also free to join any of the associations currently existing within the Romanian Orthodox 
Church which had been authorised by the national courts and operated in accordance with the 
requirements of the Church’s Statute.95 
                                                          
87 Spielmann, n 1 above, (updated version), observed that ‘the proportionality principle 
constitutes the strongest bulwark against the over-use of the margin of appreciation doctrine’, 
at 22.  
88 See J Christofferson, Fair Balance: Proportionality, Subsidiarity and Primarity in the 
ECHR (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009).  
89 A, B and C v Ireland [GC], A. 25579/05, para 231 (concerning access to abortion). 
90 Şahin v Turkey [GC], A. 30943/96, para 110 (concerning the wearing of Islamic 
headscarves in educational institutions). 
91 Evans v UK [GC], A. 6339/05, (2008) 46 EHRR 34, para 77 (concerning an ex-partner’s 
consent for the use of frozen embryos). 
92 See J Marshall, ‘S.A.S. v France: Burqa Bans and the Control or Empowerment of 
Identities’ (2015) 15 HRLR 377. 
93 Sahin v Germany, A. 30943/96, para 46 et seq. (11 October 2001).  
94 [GC] A. 2330/09 (9 July 2013). 
95 Ibid para 170. In the view of the six dissenting judges the national court did not take into 
account the competing interests and did not perform a balancing exercise to assess the 
proportionality of the adopted measure in relation to the applicant union’s rights, n 96 above, 
para 5. 
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In terms of whether the MoA applies and its width, it will be significant if the relevant 
law or policy is considered to reflect the ‘profound moral views of the people of the state’96 
or ‘concerns a question about the requirements of morals’.97 There will usually be a wide 
MoA if the State is required to strike a balance between competing private and public 
interests or competing rights and interests that are protected under the ECHR. Many religious 
rights cases are of this type. Again much turns of how the ECtHR frames or conceptualises 
the issues. The more abstract the framing the wider the MoA and vice versa. In Eweida and 
Others v UK,98 the ECtHR only found a violation in one of the cases, Eweida, in which it 
framed the issue as a balance between an individual’s right to manifest their religion and the 
employer’s wish to project a certain corporate image.99 This framing made it more likely that 
the ECHR right would weight more heavily in the balance and result in a violation, which it 
did.  In the other cases it found no violation where the balancing interest was the protection of 
the health and safety of nurses and patients (Chaplin),100 providing a public service which 
was effective in terms of practicality and efficiency and which complied with the overarching 
policy of not discriminating on grounds of sexual orientation (Ladele),101 and action by a 
private employer which was intended to secure the implementation of its policy of providing 
a service without discrimination (McFarlane).102 The framings in the latter three cases made 
the likelihood of a finding of non violation much greater, and indeed that was the result in 
each case. Where ECHR rights deserve equal respect the MoA should in principle be the 
same irrespective of which party brings the proceedings.103 In some cases it could be argued 
that the ECtHR has to readily accepted the interests being balanced against religious rights. In 
Phull v France104 a claim that the obligation to remove turban at security check at airport 
                                                          
96 A, B and C v Ireland [GC), A. 25579/05, para 241. For criticism of the deference to 
internal moral views see the partly dissenting opinion of six judges; S Krishnan, ‘What’s the 
Consensus: The Grand Chamber’s decision on abortion in A, B and C v Ireland’ (2010) 
EHRLR 200. 
97 Stübing v Germany, A. 43547/08, para 61.  
98 A. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10), para 109 (wearing of religious symbols 
by employees). See R MCrea, ‘Religion in the Workplace: Eweida and Others v UK’ (2013) 
77 Modern Law Review 277; J Maher, ‘Eweida and others: A New Era for Article 9?’ (2014) 
63 ICLQ 213. 
99 Ibid, paras 94-95. 
100 Ibid, paras 98-100. 
101 Ibid, paras 102-106. 
102 Ibid, 107-110. 
103 Axel Springer AG v Germany, A. 39954/08, para 87 (discussing articles 8 and 10 ECHR). 
104 A. 35753/03 (11 Jan 2005). Followed in El Mosrli v France, A. 15585/06 (4 March 2008) 
(Muslim woman refused to remove her veil in a French consulate during an identity check). 
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violated Article 9 was manifestly ill-founded on the basis that, ‘security checks in airports are 
undoubtedly necessary in the interests of public safety’ and the ‘arrangements for 
implementing them.... fell within the [state’s] margin of appreciation, particularly as the 
measure was resorted to only occasionally’. It can reasonably be argued that the ECtHR 
could have found that individual’s treatment was outside an acceptable MoA because the 
state could have applied a less restrictive alternative - as in Phull – via a walk-through 
scanner or hand-held detector.105 
The meaning or impact of the public expression of a religious belief will differ 
according to time and context.106 As noted, there is no uniform European conception of the 
requirements of ‘the protection of the rights of others’ in relation to attacks on their religious 
convictions.107 What is likely to cause substantial offence to persons of a particular religious 
persuasion will vary significantly from time to time and from place to place, especially in an 
era characterised by an ever growing array of faiths and denominations.  Country specific 
religious sensitivities can provide relevant and sufficient reasons justifying interference with 
an individual’s freedom of expression under Article 10.108 There is a wider MoA to impose 
restrictions on religious advertising than on commercial expression.109 However, if the 
ECtHR considers that the particular expression concerns a matter of public interest, then a 
reduced MoA applies.110 Finally, an element to which the ECtHR increasingly directs its 
attention is whether the national decision-making process, seen as a whole, provides for the 
requisite protection by weighing up the interests at stake in detail and in depth.111  
 
V. CASE STUDY: FERNANDEZ MARTINEZ V SPAIN 
                                                          
105 See SO Chaib, ‘Suku Phull v France rewritten from a procedural justice perspective: 
taking religious minorities seriously’ in Brems, n 20 above, 218-240. It is also striking that 
some decision by the Human Rights Committee under the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (1966), which asserts that it does not afford states a MoA, have found 
violations in cases where, on essentially the same facts, the ECtHR has found cases 
manifestly inadmissible. See Ranjit Singh v France, Cmn No. 1876/2000 and Mann Singh v 
France, Cmn No. 1928/2010, Bikramjit Singh v France, Cmn No 1852/2008 (all concerning 
the wearing of turbans by Sikhs, discussed in McGoldrick, n 1 above.  
106 See Dahlab v Switzerland (admiss dec.) A. 42393/98, ECHR 2001-V). 
107 Ibid. 
108 Ibid, paras 71-82. 
109 Ibid, para 70. 
110 Murphy v Ireland, A. 44179/98 (10 July 2003), para 67. 
111 See Murphy v Ireland, A. 44179/98 (10 July 2003); Fernandez-Martinez v Spain [GC], A. 
56030/07, paras 123-53, (12 June 2014); Sindicatul, n 93 above; Saul, ‘The European Court 
of Human Rights’s Margin of Appreciation and the Processes of National Parliaments’ 
(2015) 15(4) HRLR 00. 
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In June 2014, in Fernandez Martinez v Spain,112 the Grand Chamber held that a decision not 
to renew the contract of a priest, who was married with five children, to teach Catholic 
religion and morals, following the publication of an article disclosing his membership of the 
‘Movement for Optional Celibacy’, did not violate his right to private life under Article 8. As 
a case study it illustrates many of the key arguments in this essay. First, the complex and 
sophisticated manner in which the ECtHR uses the MoA as an instrument of supervision. 
Secondly, that it is the issue of framing that is crucial to the application of the identification 
or otherwise of consensus. Thirdly, the importance in the application of the MoA of the 
national domestic processes of reasoning, contestation and evaluation. Fourthly, the use of 
the MoA in the inevitable balancing of Convention rights. The ECtHR’s shift from simply 
respecting the autonomy of religious organisations to a less protective one which required a 
detailed consideration of the balancing of interests in individual cases has been a subtle 
one.113 Fifthly, that even where the ECtHR is clear that it is an area where states have a MoA, 
reasonable judges may disagree on whether a fair balance has been struck in an individual 
case. 
Fernández Martínez (FM) became a Catholic priest in 1961. In 1984 he applied to the 
Vatican for dispensation from celibacy. He did not receive a reply until 1997. In 1985 he had 
married in a civil ceremony and he and his wife had five children. Between 1991 and 1997 
FM had taught Catholic religion and ethics in a State high school in the Murcia region under 
an annually renewable contract. He was employed and remunerated by the State. However, 
according to a 1979 Agreement between the Spanish State and the Holy See, the renewal of 
the contracts for teachers of Catholic religion in public schools was subject to the approval of 
the local Bishop. Between 1991 and 1997 that approval was forthcoming notwithstanding 
FM’s marital status and despite him not having received the required dispensation from the 
Vatican. In November 1996 the Murcia newspaper La Verdad published an article about the 
‘Movement for Optional Celibacy’ of priests (MOCEOP) of which FM was an active 
member. The article included comments by a number of participants indicating their 
                                                          
112 A. 56030/07. 
113 See I Leigh, ‘New Trends in Religious Liberty and the European Court of Human Rights’ 
(2010) 12 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 266; C Evans and A Hood, ‘Religious Autonomy and 
Labour Law: A Comparison of the Jurisprudence of the US and the European Court of 
Human Rights’ (2012) 1 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 91; JD van den Vyver, ‘State 
Interference in the Internal Affairs of Religious Institutions’ (2012) 26 Emory International 
Law Review 1; Fernandez Martinez case, part V below.  
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disagreement with the Church’s position on abortion, divorce, sexuality and contraception. 
FM was named in the article and it was illustrated by a picture of FM with his family. On 15 
September 1997 FM was granted dispensation from celibacy by the Vatican in a rescript, 
which also released him from the rights and duties associated with his former clerical status. 
The rescript further indicated that he could no longer teach religion in public institutions, 
unless the local Bishop decided otherwise, ‘according to his own prudent judgment and 
provided that there [was] no scandal’. On 29 September 1997 the Bishop of Cartagena 
informed the Ministry of Education that it was not renewing FM’s contract since ‘[FM’s] 
situation [had become] a matter of public and common knowledge’, thus creating a ‘scandal’. 
FM challenged the decision in domestic employment tribunal and courts. Ultimately,  
FM’s amparo appeal with the Constitutional Court was dismissed. The Constitutional Court 
emphasised the constitutionality of the system of selecting and recruiting teachers of Catholic 
religion in State schools and pointed out that religious education teachers in Spain had a 
special status which justified taking into account their religious beliefs when they were 
chosen. It noted that the reason for the non-renewal decision had been a newspaper article 
which had given rise to a ‘scandal’ – according to the arguments of the Diocese – because it 
had made public two personal characteristics of FM already known to the Diocese: his family 
situation as a priest who was married and had several children, and his membership of the 
Movement for the Optional Celibracy of Priests (MOCEOP), which challenged certain 
precepts of the Catholic Church. That publicity constituted the factual basis for what the 
Bishop regarded as the ‘scandal’.  
FM submitted that the non-renewal of his contract of employment was a violation of his 
right to respect for private and family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. In 2012 a Chamber of the Court, by six votes to one, held that there had been 
no violation of Article 8. FM’s request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber was 
accepted. By nine votes to eight the Grand Chamber held that there had been no violation of 
Article 8. Although the ECtHR held that the application should be examined under Article 8 
there was extensive consideration of FM’s Article 9 right to freedom of thought and religion 
and the Church’s right to autonomy.  
Agreeing with the parties, the GC found that the non-renewal decision pursued the 
legitimate aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of others, namely those of the Catholic 
Church, and in particular its autonomy in respect of the choice of persons accredited to teach 
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religious doctrine.114 The central focus was on whether the limitation on FM’s Article 8 rights 
were necessary in a democratic society. The GC framed the case as one in which it had to 
weigh up the interests at stake so as to rule on a conflict between two rights that were equally 
protected by the ECHR. This balancing exercise concerned FM’s right to his private and 
family life, on the one hand, and the right of religious organisations to autonomy, on the 
other. The State was called upon to guarantee both rights and if the protection of one leads to 
an interference with the other, to choose adequate means to make this interference 
proportionate to the aim pursued. In this context, the State had a wide MoA.115 The GC 
observed that religious communities were traditionally and universally existed in the form of 
organised structures. Where the organisation of the religious community was at issue, Article 
9 must be interpreted in the light of Article 11, which safeguarded associative life against 
unjustified State interference. Seen in that perspective, the right of believers to freedom of 
religion encompassed the expectation that they would be allowed to associate freely, without 
arbitrary State intervention. The autonomous existence of religious communities was 
indispensable for pluralism in a democratic society and was thus an issue at the very heart of 
the protection which Article 9 afforded. It had a direct interest, not only for the actual 
organisation of those communities but also for the effective enjoyment by all their active 
members of the right to freedom of religion. Were the organisational life of the community 
not protected by Article 9, all other aspects of the individual’s freedom of religion would 
become vulnerable.116  
Concerning the internal autonomy of religious groups, Article 9 did not enshrine a right of 
dissent within a religious community. In the event of any doctrinal or organisational 
disagreement between a religious community and one of its members, the individual’s 
freedom of religion was exercised by the option of freely leaving the community.117 In that 
                                                          
114 See I Leigh, ‘New Trends in Religious Liberty and the European Court of Human Rights’ 
(2010) 12 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 266; C Evans and A Hood, ‘Religious Autonomy and 
Labour Law: A Comparison of the Jurisprudence of the US and the European Court of 
Human Rights’ (2012) 1 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 91; JD van den Vyver, ‘State 
Interference in the Internal Affairs of Religious Institutions’ (2012) 26 Emory International 
Law Review 1; Fernandez Martinez case, part V below.  
114 Ibid, para 122. 
115 Ibid, para 123. 
116 Ibid, para 127.  
117 This point on dissent is interesting because in Eweida and Others, n 85 above, the ECtHR 
moves its jurisprudence more firmly into the necessity for balancing and away from notions 
of non-interference, see M Pearson, ‘Article 9 at a Crossroads: Interference Before and After 
Eweida’ (2013) 13 HRLR (2013) 580. Of course, a less strict application of the non-
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context, the Court re-emphasised the State’s role as the neutral and impartial organiser of the 
exercise of various religions, faiths and beliefs, and its view that this role was conducive to 
public order, religious harmony and tolerance in a democratic society, particularly between 
opposing groups. Respect for the autonomy of religious communities recognised by the State 
implied, in particular, that the State should accept the right of such communities to react, in 
accordance with their own rules and interests, to any dissident movements emerging within 
them that might pose a threat to their cohesion, image or unity. It was therefore not the task of 
the national authorities to act as the arbiter between religious communities and the various 
dissident factions that existed or might emerge within them.118 Apart from very exceptional 
cases, the right to freedom of religion under the Convention excluded any discretion on the 
part of the State to determine whether religious beliefs or the means used to express such 
beliefs were legitimate. Moreover, the principle of religious autonomy prevented the State 
from obliging a religious community to admit or exclude an individual or to entrust someone 
with a particular religious duty.119 Where questions concerning the relationship between State 
and religions, on which opinion in a democratic society may reasonably differ widely, were at 
stake, the role of the national decision-making body must be given special importance. That 
would be the case in particular where practice in European States was characterised by a wide 
variety of constitutional models governing relations between the State and religious 
denominations.120  
As a consequence of their autonomy religious communities could demand a certain 
degree of loyalty from those working for them or representing them. In this context the nature 
of the post occupied by those persons was an important element to be taken into account 
when assessing the proportionality of a restrictive measure taken by the State or the religious 
organisation concerned. In particular, the specific mission assigned to the person concerned 
in a religious organisation was a relevant consideration in determining whether that person 
should be subject to a heightened duty of loyalty.121 A mere allegation by a religious 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
interference doctrine will necessarily mean that more issues will turn on the scope of the 
MoA afforded in relation to the particular religious issue. In some judgments the ECtHR has 
used both grounds, see Cha’are Shalom ve Tsedek  v France (27 June 2000), C Zoethout, 
‘Ritual Slaughter and the Freedom of Religion: Some Reflections on a Stunning Matter’ 
(2013) 35 Human Rights Quarterly 651. 
118 Fernández Martínez, para 128. 
119 Ibid, para 129, citing, Svyato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya v Ukraine, A. 77703/01 (14 June 
2007), para 146. 
120 Ibid, para 130, citing Şahin v. Turkey, above n 80 and Sindicatul, above n 93.. 
121 Ibid, para 131, citing, inter alia, Obst v Germany and Schüth v Germany, below n 154. 
21 
 
community that there was an actual or potential threat to its autonomy was not sufficient to 
render any interference with its members’ rights to respect for their private or family life 
compatible with Article 8. In addition, the religious community in question must also show, 
in the light of the circumstances of the individual case, that the risk alleged was probable and 
substantial and that the impugned interference with the right to respect for private life did not 
go beyond what was necessary to eliminate that risk and did not serve any other purpose 
unrelated to the exercise of the religious community’s autonomy. Neither should it affect the 
substance of the right to private and family life. The national courts must ensure that these 
conditions were satisfied, by conducting an in-depth examination of the circumstances of the 
case and a thorough balancing exercise between the competing interests at stake.122  
By signing his successive employment contracts, FM knowingly and voluntarily 
accepted a heightened duty of loyalty towards the Catholic Church, which limited the scope 
of his right to respect for his private and family life to a certain degree. Such contractual 
limitations were permissible under the Convention where they are freely accepted. Form the 
point of view of the Church’s interest in upholding the coherence of its precepts, teaching 
catholic religion to adolescents could be considered a crucial function requiring special 
allegiance. The Court was not convinced that at the time of the publication of the article in La 
Verdad, this contractual duty of loyalty had ceased to exist. Even if FM’s status as a ‘married 
priest’ was unclear, a duty of loyalty could still be expected on the basis that the Bishop had 
accepted him as a suitable representative to teach Catholic religion.123 In choosing to accept a 
publication about his family circumstances and his association with what the Bishop 
considered to be a protest-oriented meeting, FM severed the special bond of trust that was 
necessary for the fulfilment of the tasks entrusted to him. It was not unreasonable for a 
church or religious community to expect particular loyalty of religious education teachers in 
so far as they may be regarded as its representatives. The existence of a discrepancy between 
the ideas that had to be taught and the teacher’s personal beliefs might raise an issue of 
credibility if the teacher actively and publicly campaigned against the ideas in question. In 
this case the problem lay in the fact that FM could be understood to have been campaigning 
in favour of his way of life to bring about a change in the Church’s rules, and in his open 
criticism of those rules.124 For the GC it was necessary to take into account the specific 
content of FM’s teaching. As a teacher of religious education a heightened duty of loyalty 
                                                          
122 Ibid, para 132, citing Sindicatul, above n 93. 
123 Ibid, para 134. 
124 Ibid, paras 136-137. 
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was justified by the fact that, in order to remain credible, religion must be taught by a person 
whose way of life and public statements are not flagrantly at odds with the religion in 
question, especially where the religion was supposed to govern the private life and personal 
beliefs of its followers. In assessing the seriousness of the conduct of an individual employed 
by the Church it was necessary to take into account the proximity between the person’s 
activity and the Church’s proclamatory mission. In the present case, that proximity was 
clearly very close. FM was voluntarily part of the circle of individuals who were bound, for 
reasons of credibility, by a duty of loyalty towards the Catholic Church, thus limiting his 
right to respect for his private life to a certain degree. The fact of being seen as campaigning 
publicly in movements opposed to Catholic doctrine clearly ran counter to that duty. In 
addition, there was little doubt that FM, as former priest and director of a seminary, was or 
must have been aware of the substance and significance of that duty. In addition, the changes 
brought about by the publicity given to FM’s membership of MOCEOP and by the remarks 
appearing in the article were all the more important as FM had been teaching adolescents, 
who were not mature enough to make a distinction between information that was part of the 
Catholic Church’s doctrine and that which corresponded to FM’s own personal opinion.125  
That FM, like all religious education teachers in Spain, was employed and 
remunerated by the State, was not such as to affect the extent of the duty of loyalty imposed 
on FM vis-à-vis the Catholic Church or the measures that the latter was entitled to adopt if 
that duty was breached.126 The non-renewal of FM’s contract of employment constituted a 
sanction entailing serious consequences for his private and family life. However, the Bishop 
had taken those difficulties into account, pointing out that FM would be entitled to 
unemployment benefit, which in the event he did receive.127 The consequences for FM had to 
be seen in the light of the fact that he had knowingly placed himself in a situation that was 
incompatible with the Church’s precepts. FM was aware of its rules and knew that his 
conduct placed him in a situation of precariousness vis-à-vis the Bishop and made the 
renewal of his contract dependent upon the latter’s discretion. He should therefore have 
expected that the voluntary publicity of his membership of MOCEOP would not be devoid of 
consequences for his contract. Although FM had not received any prior warning before the 
decision not to renew his contract, he knew that his contract was subject to annual renewal if 
approved by the Bishop, thus involving the possibility for the latter to assess, on a regular 
                                                          
125 Ibid, paras 138-142. 
126 Ibid, para 143. 
127 Ibid, para 145. 
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basis, FM’s fulfilment of his heightened duty of loyalty. FM also knew that the Church had 
already shown tolerance in allowing him to teach Catholic religion for six years, that is, for as 
long as his personal situation which was incompatible with the precepts of that religion was 
not promoted publicly. Moreover, a less restrictive measure for FM would certainly not have 
had the same effectiveness in terms of preserving the credibility of the Church. It thus did not 
appear that the consequences of the decision not to renew his contract were excessive in the 
circumstances of the case, having regard in particular to the fact that FM had knowingly 
placed himself in a situation that was completely in opposition to the Church’s precepts.128 
The GC specifically directed its attention to the detailed review of the case by the 
successive domestic courts.129 It asserted that, although Article 8 contained no explicit 
procedural requirements, the Court could not satisfactorily assess whether the reasons 
adduced by national authorities to justify their decisions were ‘sufficient’ for the purposes of 
Article 8(2) without at the same time determining whether the decision-making process, seen 
as a whole, provided FM with the requisite protection of his interests. The domestic courts 
had taken into account all the relevant factors and weighed up the interests at stake in detail 
and in depth, within the limits imposed on them by the necessary respect for the autonomy of 
the Catholic Church. The conclusions thus reached did not appear unreasonable, particularly 
in the light of the fact that FM, as he had been a priest and the director of a seminary, was or 
must have been aware, in accepting the task of teaching Catholic religion, of the potential 
consequences of the heightened duty of loyalty vis-à-vis the Catholic Church by which he 
thus became bound, for the purpose, in particular, of preserving the credibility of his 
teaching. As for the Church’s autonomy, it did not appear, in the light of the review exercised 
by the national courts, that it was improperly invoked in the present case. The Bishop’s 
decision not to propose the renewal of FM’s contract could not be said to have contained 
insufficient reasoning, to have been arbitrary, or to have been taken for a purpose that was 
unrelated to the exercise of the Catholic Church’s autonomy.130  
In conclusion, the GC held that, having regard to the State’s MoA in the present case, 
the interference with FM’s right to respect for his private life was not disproportionate. 
Accordingly, there has been no violation of Article 8. Having regard to its conclusion under 
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130 Ibid, paras 147-151. 
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Article 8, the Court found that there was no need to examine the other complaints separately 
(these complaints included both articles 9 and 14).131  
The majority and minority accepted that the domestic authorities had a wide MoA and 
applied what they considered to be the same test of proportionality. But they came to 
radically different conclusions. The finding of no violation was by 9 votes to 8. The minority, 
including the President of the ECtHR, vehemently disagree with virtually all aspects of the 
majority ruling.132 First, the dissenters distinguished the religious decision of the Diocese, 
that is, the refusal to grant permission for the renewal of FM’s contract, from the secular 
consequences attached to that decision by the national authorities. The dissenters thus drew 
on the distinction between FM’s religious position (a ‘suspended cleric’) and his secular 
position (a teacher in a public school). The purported distinction seems rather unreal. It would 
effectively make the courts the arbiters of whether M had been involved in scandal.133 
Secondly, the non-renewal decision ‘was taken without any prior warning and without any 
opportunity for the applicant to be heard’. Thirdly, the dissenters noted that the reasons for 
FM’s ‘dismissal’, that was, the fact that he had created a ‘scandal’ – had (i) only been 
indicated in a rescript that was drawn up after the publication of the newspaper article; (ii) 
had already been publicly known to the Church, the school and the parents of the pupils long 
before the publication of the article; and (iii) were outside of FM’s control, as it had not been 
he himself who had published his marital status and membership of the Movement for 
Optional Celibacy, but a journalist. Fourthly and finally, the dissenters criticised the Ministry 
for not having considered less restrictive alternatives. However, they give no indication of 
what those alternatives could have been. 
  Such close votes in the Grand Chamber are relatively rare and do not do much for the 
integrity and legitimacy of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence.134 Although the GC gave significant 
weight to the autonomy of the church, it is noticeable that it was not prepared to accept that a 
mere allegation by a religious community that there was an actual or potential threat to its 
autonomy was sufficient. There had to be a thorough balancing exercise between the 
                                                          
131 Ibid, paras 152-155. 
132 There was a joint dissent by all 8 judges, a dissent by three judges, and two individual 
dissenting opinions.  
133 See also the dissenting opinion of Judge Sajò at para 5 (‘The “scandal” was not 
convincingly translated to meet the requisite judicial standards. Or better put, it was accepted 
that it was above and beyond the need for such translation.’) 
134 The same observation can be made in relation to the 9-8 decision in Animal Defenders 
International v UK, [GC] A. 48876/08, 22 April 2013. The majority and the minority also 
differed in their assessment of whether there was a European consensus. 
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competing interests at stake and it had to have been conducted by the national authorities.135 
What was ultimately critical for the majority was that they viewed FM as campaigning 
publicly in movements opposed to Catholic doctrine. For them this clearly ran counter to his 
duty of loyalty towards the Catholic Church. The best case to explain the eight dissenters is 
that the one they themselves gave. They simply saw the same case differently in relation to 
the establishment of the facts; the characterisation of the facts in the light of Article 8; and the 
application of Article 8 to the facts of the case.136 Lawyers may appreciate the fine art 
involved in alternative perceptions and legal categorisations of the same facts and in 
assessing what is a fair balance.  
But the real concern is that secular courts are claiming the prerogative to undermine 
religious autonomy by making secular determinations on the status of persons as employees, 
priest or ministers,137 and on how religious organisations should deal, both substantively and 
procedurally, with members whose actions or activities are inconsistent with religious 
beliefs.138 Any degree of balancing of rights necessarily gives less protection to the interest of 
religious organisations than does a simple deference to their religious autonomy. The 
decisions of the national courts must be reasoned and reasonable. They must weigh up the 
interests at stake in detail and in depth but, and this is crucial, they can do so within the limits 
imposed on them by the necessary respect for the autonomy of the particular religion in the 
context of their national constitutional system. The national court’s conclusions will be 
accepted by the ECtHR as long as they do not appear unreasonable on the facts. The national 
authorities have to ensure that the Church’s autonomy is not improperly invoked. That 
requires that the decision of the religious authorities must contain sufficient reasoning, not be 
                                                          
135 Following the ECtHR’s balancing approach in relation to lay persons in Obst v Germany, 
A. 425/03 (23 September 2010), Schüth v Germany, A. 1620/03, (23 September 2010) and 
Siebenhaar v Germany, A. 18136/02 (3 February 2011). In Schüth the ECtHR found a 
violation of Article art. 8, primarily because the German courts had not engaged in a real 
balancing exercise between the Convention rights of the Church and those of S. See 
McGoldrick, n 8 above; I Leigh, ‘Balancing Religious Autonomy and Other Human Rights 
under the European Convention’ (2012) 1 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 109.  
136 See Fernández Martínez, n 130 above, Joint Dissenting Opinion of the eight Judges, para 
1. 
137 See P Slotte and H Årsheim, (eds) Special Issue on Ministerial Exception (2015) 4(2) 
Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 171-302. 
138 See S Smet, ‘Fernández Martínez v Spain: The Grand Chamber Putting the Brakes on the 
‘Ministerial Exception’ for Europe?’ Strasbourg Observers, (23 June 2014) available at 
http://strasbourgobservers.com/2014/06/23/fernandez-martinez-v-spain-the-grand-chamber-
putting-the-breaks-on-the-ministerial-exception-for-europe/. See also Baroness Hale, ‘Secular 
Judges and Christian Law’ (2015) 17 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 170. 
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arbitrary and not be taken for a purpose that was unrelated to the exercise of the religion’s 
autonomy. A contractual acceptance of obligations of loyalty will be given weight. So too 
will the religious beliefs of a person who wishes to engage in teaching the morals or ethics of 
a particular religion. This is to preserve the right to religious freedom in its collective 
dimension. The effect of the MoA is thus that the ECtHR’s role is necessarily more limited 
than it might be outside of the religious context. However, the ECtHR maintains its 
perception of the MoA as an instrument of supervision. The state must remain within its MoA 
and a ‘fair balance’ must be maintained between the various private interests.139 
As noted, the majority and minority accepted that the domestic authorities had a wide 
MoA and applied what they considered to be the same test of proportionality. But they came 
to radically different conclusions. If that happened consistently it would ultimately cast doubt 
on the credibility of the MoA as a conceptual tool because of the resulting uncertainty in its 
application. Fortunately such deep divisions are rare. In the vast majority of cases the results 
of applying the MoA, even when it involves consideration of a complex multiplicity of 
factors and elements, and the balancing of equally rights, is a unanimous decision or a strong 
majority.140 
 
VII. CONCLUDING COMMENTS  
 
It is submitted that when properly understood the MoA is a complex, sophisticated and 
defensible intellectual instrument141 for international bodies supervising polycentric rights 
claims, which is commonly the case in relation to religious rights.142 It is like a multi-
dimensional chess game in which a lot of pieces are in play along a number of axes. In 
religious cases, as in others, the MoA factors may combine and interact in different ways, 
sometimes pulling in different directions in the context of a single case. This complexity and 
uncertainty may not satisfy jurisprudential purists or pure universalists. But it represents a 
sensible pragmatic legal doctrine for a system applying to 47 states and over 820 million 
people. The consequence of affording states a MoA in religion-related cases is that an 
acceptable and human rights compliant overall balance can be achieved in a number of ways. 
Thus conceived the MoA plays a crucial role in building a complex multi-level community 
                                                          
139 Fernández Martínez, para 114. 
140 As in Sahin, above n 80 and Lautsi, above n 18. 
141 See also Legg, n 1 above, who strongly supports the use of the MoA.  
142 See G Webber, ‘Proportionality, Balancing, and the Cult of Constitutional Rights 
Scholarship’ (2010) 23 Canadian J of Law and Jurisprudence 179. 
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amongst the 47 Council of Europe States. The MoA can thus assist in mediating between the 
idea of universal human rights and leaving space for reasonable disagreement, legitimate 
differences, and national or local cultural diversity.143 It is submitted that the MoA is a 
sufficiently sophisticated and flexible instrument of supervision. As noted, its application can 
be sensitive to special historical or political considerations, the relative importance of the 
interest at stake, sensitive moral or ethical issues, the balancing of private and public 
interests, and complex scientific and technical issues. Assessing all of these kinds of factors 
in religion-related cannot be avoided so their explicit acknowledgment makes for more open 
and transparent reasoning 
The MoA gives States ‘room for manoeuvre’144 while retaining strong elements of 
European supervision. It is submitted that the complexity of factors taken account of in 
ECtHR’s methodology in applying the MoA, including the weight given to consensus, leads 
to reason-based, justificatory arguments.145 There is thus a process of reasoning, contestation 
and evaluation which is engaged in by democratic Parliaments146 and courts and, to some 
extent, the people.147 Giving a significant but not necessarily determinative weight to the 
existence or non-existence of a consensus is a sensible and credible tool to ensure that the 
evolution of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence keeps pace with but does not move so far ahead of 
societal changes within Europe that it creates significant risk of non-implementation.148 The 
MoA can thus be understood as a device which, in those situations in which it is appropriate 
                                                          
143 See Legg, n 1 above on ‘affording appropriate respect for local values in the states’ 
implementation of their international human rights obligations’, 225. 
144 This expression is used the ECtHR’s Press Releases to describe the operation of the MoA, 
see Junta Rectora Del Ertzainen Nazional Elkartasuna v Spain, A. 45892/09, (21 April 
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to apply it,149 can mediate between the idea of universal human rights and leaving space for 
reasonable disagreement, legitimate differences, and national or local cultural diversity.150  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
149 It is important to re-emphacise that, as explained in Part III above, the ECtHR’s religion-
related jurisprudence has been very strong in a number of critical respects, and in those areas 
there has been little if any scope for the MoA to be accorded.  
150 See DL Donoho, ‘Autonomy, Self-Governance, and the Margin of Appreciation: 
Developing a Jurisprudence of Diversity Within Universal Human Rights’ (2001) 15 Emory 
Intl LR 391; McGoldrick, n 1 above (2016); Henrard, n 22 above. 
